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The recent joined cases that brought Costa Rica and Nicaragua into 
conflict before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerned the 
two states’ activities in the border area. In particular, they focused on 
the dredging of some parts of the shared San Juan river by Nicaragua, 
and the construction of a road by Costa Rica on the other side of the 
same river. In neither of the cases had the countries conducted an envi-
ronmental impact assessment (EIA) prior to the start of the activities. 
The question of compliance with the obligation of both countries to 
conduct an EIA was therefore a central part of the case, especially since 
the area under scrutiny had been designated as a wetland of interna-
tional importance under the Ramsar Convention. This treaty imposes 
certain substantive and procedural obligations on parties to promote 
the ‘wise use’ of wetlands in their territory.1 However, the Ramsar Con-
vention does not contain an express obligation to conduct an EIA and 
so the claims on this subject were decided exclusively as a matter of cus-
tomary international law.2 In evaluating the case, it is important to ap-
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1 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, (adopted 2 February 1971, 
entered into force 21 December 1975) 996 UNTS 245 (‘Ramsar Convention’), 169 con-
tracting parties at the time of writing. The parties had alleged violations of arts 3(2) and 
5 of the Ramsar Convention, requiring notification and consultation, but the Court 
dismissed these claims; see Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan 
River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Joined Cases 16 December 2015) [2015] ICJ Rep (‘Cos-
ta Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica’) paras 109-110, 172. 
2 It had also been alleged that there had been a breach of Article 14 of the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993) 
1760 UNTS 79, relating to EIA, but the Court held that ‘the provision at issue does not 
create an obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment before undertak-
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preciate the nature of customary international law as a dynamic source 
of law, but one which sets a high threshold for demonstrating that de-
velopments have taken place.3 
The Court began its judgment on this issue by reaffirming its juris-
prudence developed in the Pulp Mills case,4 and confirming that the ob-
ligation to conduct an EIA is one of general international law.5 The 
Court goes on to immediately clarify a number of matters that had been 
unclear in its previous judgment on this matter. Firstly, the judgment 
removes any doubt that the obligation to conduct an EIA applies to all 
activities that have the potential to cause ‘a significant adverse impact in 
a transboundary context’6, and not just to the types of ‘industrial activi-
ties’ that had been at issue in previous cases. Secondly, the judgment 
makes it clear that the content of an EIA is not completely dependent 
on domestic legislation, but is to be assessed against international 
standards.7 The clarification addresses any confusion that had been 
caused by the Pulp Mills case, which emphasized the importance of na-
tional laws in the implementation of the customary rule. According to 
the Court in the present case, ‘determination of the content of the envi-
ronmental impact assessment should be made in light of the specific 
circumstances of the case.’8 In other words, states must carry out their 
obligation with due diligence.9 
When it comes to the nature and source of the obligation relating to 
EIA, however, the 2015 judgment unfortunately leaves unresolved some 
 
ing an activity that may have significant adverse effects on biological diversity’. Costa 
Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica, para 164. 
3 The Court has said that it is necessary to prove ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ 
state practice in order to establish a rule of customary international law; North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/Netherlands) (Merits 20 
February 1969) [1969] ICJ Rep 1969 para 73. In the Glamis Gold Arbitration, the Tri-
bunal noted ‘it is difficult to establish a change in customary international law’ and the 
burden of proof falls upon the claimant to establish such a change; Glamis Gold v Unit-
ed States of America, UNCITRAL Arbitration (8 June 2009) paras 602-603. 
4 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits 20 April 2010) ICJ 
Reports 2010 (‘Pulp Mills’) para 204. 
5 Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica (n 1) para 104. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard para 18. 
8 Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica (n 1) para 104. 
9 See J Harrison, ‘Significant International Environmental Law Cases: 2015-2016’ 
(2016) 28 J Environmental L 533, 537-538. 
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of the ambiguity of the Pulp Mills case. This is in part because of the 
continuing reference to ‘general international law.’ Whilst this termi-
nology has the advantage of not directly mentioning either customary 
international law or general principles of law, it leaves the source of the 
obligation ambiguous. Despite the fact that the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber in its 2011 Advisory Opinion described EIA as a ‘general ob-
ligation under customary international law’,10 the Court did not take 
this further step and only referred to its previous dicta in the Pulp Mills 
case. However, it is widely accepted that the Court’s reference to gen-
eral international law should be interpreted as a reference to customary 
international law.11 Even if this is accepted, there are questions about 
how to identify the scope and content of such an obligation. The open-
ness of the judgment on this question allowed the judges on the bench 
to express different opinions on the matter. Indeed, several judges disa-
greed as to whether the obligation to conduct an EIA exists as an inde-
pendent customary rule or as an intrinsic part of the obligation of due 
diligence. These different approaches to the methodological determina-
tion of the obligation to conduct an EIA will be closely examined in the 
remainder of this analysis.  
In his separate opinion, Judge ad hoc Dugard argues that trans-
boundary EIA is a separate obligation sustained by state practice and 
opinio juris. Indeed, he asserts that the obligation to conduct an EIA ‘is 
not […] dependent on the obligation of a State to exercise due dili-
gence in preventing significant harm’.12 Rather, he describes due dili-
gence as ‘the standard of care required when carrying out the EIA and 
not the obligation itself”.13 As the obligation to conduct an EIA is inde-
pendent, Judge ad hoc Dugard argues, the question of its legal nature 
has to be assessed separately, concluding that there is enough evidence 
of opinio juris and state practice to establish such an obligation as a mat-
ter of customary international law.14 There is some support for this ap-
 
10 Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons 
and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (1 February 2011) ITLOS Case No 17 
(‘Sponsoring States Advisory Opinion’) para 145. 
11 See Separate Opinion Judge Donoghue, para 2; Separate Opinion of Judge ad 
hoc Dugard para 17. 
12 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard para 9. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid paras 12-17. 
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proach in the Pulp Mills case, where the ICJ found that ‘[state] practice, 
… in recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it 
may now be considered a requirement under general international law 
to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk 
that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse im-
pact in a transboundary context.’15 Yet, as is common in its practice16, 
the Court did not expressly identify the relevant evidence in this regard, 
nor did Judge ad hoc Dugard take up this challenge. 
By contrast, Judge Donoghue’s separate opinion17 argues that state 
practice and opinio juris are not the only means of identifying rules of 
customary international law, which may also be deduced from ‘funda-
mental parameters of the international legal order.’18 For Judge Do-
noghue, reliance on state practice and opinio juris is problematic in the 
context of EIA, because of the lack of evidence before the Court. In this 
respect, she specifically says that without proof of opinio juris and state 
practice, ‘the Court is not in a position to articulate specific rules’.19 
Moreover, she clearly is of the view that ‘the Court is ill-equipped to 
conduct its own survey of the laws and practices of various States on 
this topic.’20 In comparison, Judge Donoghue argues, the deduction of 
rules from the fundamental parameters of the international legal order 
is a more straightforward exercise. In her opinion, one parameter rele-
vant to the case at hand is the principle of due diligence, which itself is 
deduced from the principle of the sovereign equality of states. This 
leads Judge Donoghue to conclude that ‘the rights and obligations of 
parties should be assessed with reference to the underlying due dili-
gence obligation’ and ‘the question whether a proposed activity calls for 
specific measures, such as an environmental impact assessment […] 
should be judged against this underlying obligation of due diligence’.21 
She further asserts that the ‘requirement to exercise due diligence, as 
 
15 Pulp Mills (n 4) para 204. 
16 See eg the recent discussion in S Talmon, ‘Determining Customary International 
Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion’ (2015) 26 
Eur J Intl L 417. 
17 Judge Owada is of the same opinion; see Separate Opinion of Judge Owada pa-
ras 18 and 21. 
18 Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue para 3. 
19 ibid para 10. 
20 ibid para 18. 
21 ibid para 1. 
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the governing primary norm, is an obligation of conduct that applies to 
all phases of a project’.22 She argues that the obligation of due diligence 
is to be assessed in light of particular circumstances, and can mean that 
different obligations spring from them accordingly.23 This approach ar-
guably allows more flexibility than the approach taken by Judge ad hoc 
Dugard. 
This debate about the source of the obligation to carry out a trans-
boundary EIA is not merely an academic discussion. Its practical impli-
cations are clearly illustrated by the closely related question of whether 
obligations to notify and consult with the other countries potentially af-
fected by an activity are attached to the obligation to conduct an EIA. 
Does such an obligation stem from the consolidated practice and opinio 
juris of states on the matter, or does it arise independently through ap-
plication of the principle of due diligence? The judgment is once again 
ambiguous on this point, simply saying that ‘if the [EIA] confirms that 
there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, the State planning to 
undertake the activity is required, in conformity with its due diligence 
obligation, to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially af-
fected State, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate 
measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.’24 From this statement, it 
would seem that consultation is only required following the conduct of 
an EIA. Yet, Judge Donoghue considers that it is too reductive to at-
tach the obligation to consult and notify as a follow-up to the conduct 
of an EIA, and suggests that the obligation to consult and notify can ex-
ist independently from the obligation to conduct an EIA, as it also 
stems from the general obligation of due diligence. Thus, she argues, 
the obligation to consult may also arise, in certain circumstances, prior 
to conducting an EIA.25 
There may be further ramifications of adopting either of these posi-
tions, including on the stringency of the requirements imposed on 
states. In this respect, Judge ad hoc Dugard warns: 
 
‘the danger of viewing the due diligence obligation as the source of the 
obligation to perform an EIA is that it allows a State to argue, retro-
 
22 ibid para 9. 
23 ibid para 24. 
24 Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica (n 1) para 104. 
25 Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue para 21. 
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spectively, that because no harm has been proved at the time of the le-
gal proceedings, no duty of due diligence arose at the time the project 
was planned.’26 
 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that classifying this as a question of 
due diligence to be answered on a case-by-case basis creates a degree of 
ambiguity about what is required from states, thereby undermining the 
preventative effect of customary rules. As the Seabed Disputes Cham-
ber stated in its Advisory Opinion in 2011, due diligence ‘may not easily 
be described in precise terms’ because it is ‘variable’. It may change 
‘over time’ and ‘in relation to the risks involved in the activity’.27 The 
commentary to the ILC Draft Articles on the Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm explains further that ‘due diligence is manifested in 
reasonable efforts by a State to inform itself of factual or legal compo-
nents that relate foreseeably to a contemplated procedure and to take 
appropriate measures in timely fashion, to address them’.28 This criti-
cism relating to the ambiguity of due diligence, whilst apt, is not with-
out a response. Even if the due diligence standard may be variable, it is 
still possible to derive some content from it.  
Firstly, the substantive content of the due diligence obligation can 
be informed through the application of the procedural elements of due 
diligence, such as the obligation to notify and consult the potentially af-
fected states. If this obligation can apply to the preliminary phases of 
preparing an EIA (ie screening and scoping), as suggested by Judge 
Donoghue, it can also help to shape the actual content of the EIA, by 
ensuring that the process is subject to external scrutiny. 
Secondly, the obligation of due diligence must be interpreted in 
light of the development of more specific rules or procedures on the 
conduct of EIAs, through which states agree on what steps should be 
taken when carrying out an EIA. Many of these subsequent develop-
ments take the form of so-called ‘soft law’, such as the UNEP Goals and 
Principles on EIA or the Voluntary Guidelines for Biodiversity-
Inclusive Impact Assessment adopted under the Convention on Biolog-
 
26 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard para 10. 
27 Sponsoring States Advisory Opinion (n 10) para 117. 
28 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities’ submitted as a part of the Commission’s report to the 
UN General Assembly UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) 154. 
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ical Diversity.29 Given the explicit non-binding status and lack of nor-
mative language in such instruments, it may be difficult to argue that 
such ‘soft law’ instruments have influenced the development of manda-
tory rules that must be followed in each and every case.30 Yet, it is not 
necessary to argue that these instruments have attained the status of 
customary international law in order for them to play a role in this con-
text, as states may simply use compliance with such instruments as evi-
dence that they have acted with due diligence. It is in this respect that 
states would be well advised to pay heed to soft law instruments relating 
to EIA, with a view to defending potential claims that they have not ex-
ercised due diligence. 
Even if it is accepted that it is possible to give some more specific 
content to the due diligence obligation, we are still left with a relatively 
weak and obscure standard. Indeed, one of the criticisms of this case is 
that the Court did not go far enough in setting a rigorous standard for 
EIA as a matter of customary international law. Yet, one must remem-
ber that courts are not law-makers. It could also be argued that we 
should not place all of our hopes for the development of EIA on cus-
tomary international law, which by its very nature tends to follow, ra-
ther than set, trends of innovative practice. Whilst custom plays an im-
portant role in ensuring that there is a safety net of minimum environ-
mental standards that must be followed by all states, it is highly optimis-
tic to think that custom should be the main source of rules for environ-
mental protection. It is arguably because they offer the possibility of de-
veloping more detailed rules of conduct that we have witnessed such a 
proliferation of environmental treaty-making in the past decades. As 
Judge Bandhari showed in his separate opinion,31 the customary obliga-
tion already co-exists with the Espoo Convention32, which despite orig-
inating as a regional treaty, has been opened to participation from a 
 
29 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 
1993) 1760 UNTS 79. See CBD COP Decision VIII/28 (2006). This instrument has par-
ticular relevance in the present context, given that the guidelines have been expressly 
endorsed by the parties to the Ramsar Convention; see Ramsar COP Decision X.17 
(2008). 
30 See eg Pulp Mills (n 4) para 205.  
31 Separate Opinion of Judge Bandhari para 24.  
32 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
(adopted 25 February 1991, entered into force 10 September 1997) 1989 UNTS 309 
(‘Espoo Convention’). 
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much broader range of states. What this text adds is a potential basis 
for what Judge Bandhari calls ‘an exemplary standard for the process to 
be followed when conducting an EIA.’33 There is little doubt that the 
Espoo Convention has the potential to take on the role of a global re-
gime for transboundary EIA, but it falls far short at present, with only 
45 parties, mostly coming from Europe.34 Encouraging participation in 
this treaty would therefore be an alternative means of promoting robust 
standards for the conduct of EIAs at a global level.  
In sum, it is unanimously accepted that the obligation to conduct an 
EIA in a transboundary context is part of customary international law. 
However, when this obligation applies and what it requires is still open 
to debate. The recent cases before the International Court of Justice 
opposing Costa Rica and Nicaragua offered an opportunity for the 
judges to develop their views on the matter, but the judgment, whilst 
delivering some further clarity, leaves many important questions unre-
solved. Two perspectives on the development of customary internation-
al law rules on EIA are offered by the judges, each leading to very dif-
ferent perceptions on the nature and content of the relevant rules. One 
could ask which of these views is to be preferred, but this might be the 
wrong question. It is not necessary to see the future of transboundary 
EIA as a mere choice between the methods proposed by Judge ad hoc 
Dugard and Judge Donoghue, but rather it is possible to accept that 
rules relating to transboundary EIA can stem from both state prac-
tice/opinio juris and from a general obligation of due diligence. Indeed, 
acknowledging both methodologies for deriving rules of custom, whilst 
being clear about the opportunities and limits of the method to be em-
ployed in each, is probably the best means of ensuring that customary 
international law develops in such a manner as to promote adequate 
levels of environmental protection. Moreover, it is important to remem-
ber that not all of our attention should be focused on customary inter-
national law and further efforts should be made to promote the wide-
spread acceptance of the Espoo Convention as a treaty to provide a 
more specific set of minimum standards for transboundary EIA, whilst 
 
33 Separate Opinion of Judge Bandhari para 32. See also para 33. 
34 The Court refused to consider the application of the Espoo Convention in the 
Pulp Mills case for the simple fact that neither Argentina nor Uruguay were parties; 
Pulp Mills (n 4) para 205. 
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also encouraging states to accept the compulsory settlement of dispute 
under the Convention in accordance with Article 15.35 After all, what 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ to date does demonstrate is that interna-
tional courts and tribunals can play an important role in settling dis-




35 Art 15 of the Espoo Convention invites states to accept either arbitration or the 
International Court of Justice as a means for the settlement of disputes under the Con-
vention, but such acceptance only applies insofar as the other party to the dispute has 
also accepted the same forum. To date, only Austria, Bulgaria, Liechtenstein, and the 
Netherlands have accepted one or both of the means of dispute settlement under art 15. 
